As far as I know, married women have to cover their head for tzniut (modesty). A common way to do this is by wearing a wig. But sometimes the wig looks even prettier than the women's hair. Wouldn't this be more provocative?
Answer
Other answers have done well to reference the letter and the spirit of the law. A wig, even a beautiful one, covers both bases.
The gemara in Kesubos 72a-b lays out the obligation of a married Israelite woman covering her hair as two-fold: Biblical (deoraysa), and as a matter of Jewish practice (das yehudis). This is a harmonization of two Tannatic sources, namely the Mishna in Ketubos under discussion , in which it is purely a matter of Jewish practice, and Tanna deVei Rabbi Yishmael, where the implication is that it is Biblical.
For matters Biblical, one does not, as a practical matter of applying the law, deduce reasons. One does not look to the spirit of the law, but applies the letter of the law. This is the dispute of whether darshinan taama dekra (whether we deduce the purpose of the law), where the halachic conclusion is that we do not. I've heard explanations for this, including that one's suggested or understood reason might well not be the correct, or the only, reason for the Biblical law.
Within that gemara in Kesubos, the Biblical obligations are less than the 'Jewish practice' obligations. Thus, a kalta (Rashi: a sort of basket-hat), while sufficient Biblically in certain locations, does not fulfill the 'Jewish practice' obligation.
I would suggest that, rather than 'Jewish practice' being a matter of increased chumra (stringency), this instead means that a kalta would fulfill the strict letter of the law. Her hair is, after all, covered, and so she has fulfilled the Biblical mandate. However, as a matter of common propriety, of the common practice of Jewish women covering their hair, a kalta did not suffice. This could be read as a matter of fulfilling the spirit of the law, whatever we define that "spirit" as.
Nowadays, the wig is considered, in certain religious communities, as the common practice for Jewish women covering their hair. I would say that it is das yehudis. Further, das yehudis, not being Biblical and objective, shifts with time, place, and community, along with other subjective aspects of tznius. (For example, whether one must cover her feet is halachically a subjective matter, which halachically depends on one's community.)
I'll add three points in closing.
1) The Bavli discusses kalta (the basket-hat), with a statement by Rabbi Yochanan. אמר רבי אסי אמר ר' יוחנן קלתה אין בה משום פרוע ראש. Rabbi Assi cited Rabbi Yochanan: A kalta lacks any problem of uncovered head. The Bavli then distinguishes between Biblical and Das Yehudis, between private domain, courtyard, alleyway, and marketplace.
The Yerushalmi(Yerushalmi Kesubos 42b) has a parallel statement, and distinguishes between locale, but never makes the harmonization between Mishna and Tana deVei Rabbi Yishmael to bring in a Biblical aspect. But that Yerushalmi has a statement by Rabbi Yochanan: רבי חייה בשם רבי יוחנן היוצאה בקפלטין שלה אין בה משום ראשה פרוע Rabbi Chiya citing Rabbi Yochanan said: One [a woman] who goes out with her kapilitin, there is not in it an issue of uncovered head.
The word kapilitin is actually Latin. It is a cappilitium, which is a wig.
So a wig is placed in the same approximate place as a Babylonian kalta.
I would say that a similar sentiment as those who, throughout the ages, have wanted to ban wigs, is motivating Rabbi Yochanan's statement. Despite "looking like her hair", besides being hair, besides "making her look more attractive", it fulfills the obligation.
And this furthermore places the wig explicitly within the realm of das Yehudis, which I would say is subjective and dependent upon common Jewish women's practice.
2) The spirit of the law, that is, the motivating principle, is not necessarily what some people assume. It is not necessarily that hair is so beautiful and provocative that it is akin to, and must be treated as nakedness and pornographic (erva). And that fake hair, if beautiful and attractive, is more so, and would have the same status.
I had a discussion online with someone who made a statement along these lines, of assuming reasons and therefore application: "of course, no one would say that a woman could put her own hair on her head as a wig. So why would you say that she could take another woman's hair and put it on her head." I pointed out that the Mishna Brurah explicitly says that a woman can use her own disconnected hair as a wig. (And there are associated reasons why it is different than her connected hair.) My point: don't assume your own reason as an absolute known entity.
3) Throughout generations (rishonim, acharonim, I would say even possibly Amoraim), there have been disputes as to the status of the wig, with some arguing that X defeats the purpose and others arguing that it is fine. That is, this is not a new dispute and a newly discovered argument. I am writing this because some try to argue that innovations in sheitel making makes modern wigs a different animal than the wigs of prior generations. However, this is not the case. Back when Rav Moshe Feinstein permitted wigs (see Igros Moshe, Even haEzer chelek 2, siman 12), he explicitly addressed (as a matter of maris ayin) a wig which is indistinguishable from a woman's natural hair, where it seems she is not wearing a wig. And Rav Shalom Shwadron, in 1972 or earlier, complained of realistic looking wigs, such that the woman didn't look married. This is not exactly the same argument as "looks prettier", but that is just the latest spin to try to make this in to a new issue, different than the ones discussed by Rabbis through the ages.
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