Monday, April 22, 2019

halacha theory - When do rabbinic enactments apply if the given reason no longer does?


Often we find gezeiros d'rabbanan designed as preventative measures against more serious transgressions. However, if nowadays the reasoning behind the gezeira does not apply, it seems that sometimes we say "batla ta'am batla takana"- if the reason no longer applies, neither does the enactment- and sometimes we do not say this, but rather continue to obey the enactment even after its reasoning is no longer applicable.


For example: On the one hand, with regard to the takana not to lend money to gentiles with interest so as not to become involved in business with non-jews and become familiar with their way of life, we say that today one may do so even if not necessary for his livelihood (the loophole offered by chazal), since we are all anyways involved in business with non-jews.



Also, with regard to dancing on Shabbos, Tosafos (beitza 30a ד"ה תנן) hold that today (at least in their day) since people are not experts in musical instrument repair, there is no reason left to continue the takana.


On the other hand, we find that people still practice mayim acharonim after meals even though the danger described by chazal no longer exists. We find that people are careful not to depict the full sun or moon, even though celestial worshipers have virtually ceased to exist as well. Also, some insist that it is still prohibited to do laundry on Friday even though laundry is much quicker today than it was in Ezra HaSofer's time.


The question is: Is there a proper distinction between two types of rabbinic enactments that allows us to distinguish whether or not continuation of the enactment is dependent on the reason it was enacted? [Please cite sources.]




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